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Abstract 
Compared with the commercial banks, cooperative banks remained relatively unscathed during the 2007’s crisis. In this paper, 
we look for possible explanations as to their first-rate performance. To this end, we analyze the past and present indicators of the 
cooperative system, particularly in terms of internal governance’s mechanism. Our sample is composed of a number of European 
banks which has attempted to study the presence of an impact, affected by the new governance of cooperative banks, on their 
performance. It has been revealed that, differing to previous research; members of the cooperative banks have a negative impact 
on performance. However, our study showed that the law of membership may be the fundamental cause for its performance. 
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1. Introduction 
It is little known in the literature about competition and performance of small regional credit institutions in 
economic development, given the variety of local structures. However, cooperative banks along with the 
commitment of their members have influenced the regional and local growth particularly in the period of the 
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financial crisis 2007. These banks along with their 56million members, 4,000 member banks 72,000 branches, over 
850,000 employees and 181 million customers (EACB, 2012 p.4) were able to promote local development and 
entrepreneurship.  By adhering to the social and solidarity economy (SSE), theses banks were able to distinguish 
themselves from conventional banks. This distinction mostly presents itself in the fact that cooperative banks’ 
owners, who are also their customers, can be a part in the cooperation. For that, members cannot accumulate votes 
by purchasing shares on the market. Seeing that cooperative banks ling to the principle of one member one vote 
regardless of the amount of capital retained; yet, this principle depends on the capacity and the size of the banking 
system. Furthermore, this stakeholders' structure is more effective in term of governance comparing to the other 
banks. Its efficacy displays itself in the insolvency risk reduction and customers satisfaction guarantee (EACB, 
2012). 
The previous literature surrounding cooperative banks have focused on their risk of default (Fiordelisi and Mare, 
2013), their performance and stability, especially during the financial crisis (Groeneveld and De Vries, 2009), 
(Fiordelisi and Salvatore, 2014), the fragility of cooperative banks compared to commercial banks ( Hesse and 
Cihák ,2007), for that banks are more stable and creditworthy  because they are controlled by the population. In this 
context ,Groeneveld (2012)† empirically proved  that the number of members has continued to increase on the 
financial and economic plans along with the population's booming during and after the financial crisis of 2007. 
However, for other researchers the size seems to be an obstacle to their development and positively related to 
systemic risk (Vallascas and Keasey, 2012 De Jonghe, 2010). At this point, the majority of cooperative banks are 
small rural credit institutions. Therefore they are more fragile to be exposed to financial crises. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the behavior of these stakeholders internal governance could be the key to their performance. 
Specifically, although the profitability of cooperative banks is less volatile than the commercial banks in times of 
crisis are, however, knowledge is an advantage to their performance.  
The specificity of the Multi-Stakeholders governance of cooperative banks can be a differentiator from other 
banks. Indeed, membership is one of the main distinguishing traits of cooperative banks and it can be said that it's 
the foundation of such institution. If all the members have an equal right to vote at the General Assembly of the 
cooperative, their influence would be major since according to the social and participatory democratic values they 
exercise control at each level. It is the act of involving their employees, their customers in the operation, 
management and governance of their inspiration in the economic and social development. Suffice to say that 
cooperative banks are characterized by a mode of governance "multi-stakeholders". It is a mode of governance that 
takes into account the views of the various human resources that are part of the banking business, such as customers, 
shareholders, the employees (Groeneveld and Llewellyn, 2011). In this context, some financial numbers believe that 
this mode of governance can only be beneficial to the growth of cooperative banks. Specifically, in a commercial 
bank, the shareholder withdraws when there is a difficulty, as his shares are no longer sufficiently profitable. By 
cons, when a cooperative company faces a problem, members are more supportive and try to solve it together. Given 
their involvement in the bank's governance, customers are more motivated to effectively contribute to their business 
well-being. Yet such partnership and democratic foundation can create discord among stakeholders (Hill and Jones,
1992). They pointed out that this character can produce a divergence of interests between the different categories of
stakeholders and hence, their dissolution.  However, these banks considered weak in comparison with other banks 
survived the crisis and were able to reach large portions of their target market. 
Debating whether the cooperative banks are more efficient than commercial banks‡ or not, this article analyzes 
the importance of Multi-Stakeholder governance   on the performance of cooperative banks. Recent studies have 
 
 
† Graphic made by Groeneveld (2012) in his article "The Cooperative Banking Model: Performance and Opportunities" Working Paper 
Rabobank Nederland, Utrecht, the Netherlands. According to the annual reports of cooperative banks and national demographic statistics between 
1996 and 2010
‡ The purpose of this article is not a comparison between the cooperative banks and commercial banks, this has already been analyzed in the 
articles of (Fiordelisi and Salvatore,2014),( Fu Lin and Molyneux,2014) 
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focused on the performance of cooperative banks and financial stability (Fiordelisi and Salvatore, 2014), or on the 
effectiveness of members in the cooperative banks (Gorton and Schmid, 1999). Although there is literature 
investigating the link between members and the performance of the cooperative banks, to our knowledge, no study 
has specifically analyzed the internal disciplinary mechanism for cooperative banks and its relation on its 
performance during the crisis financial 2007. Knowing that everyone involved in the bank either internally or 
externally such as customers can be part of the banks, Thus we were led to wonder about the factors that have most 
impact on the performance of cooperative banks in crisis? Is it increasing number of membership, employees or 
members that is the cause? Or it comes to the influence of their size and capital. 
To illustrate our assumptions, the rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section will be devoted to 
the literature review and the specific hypotheses to be tested. The third section will present the methodology and 
results used in the analysis. Finally, the fourth section will be devoted to the conclusion. 
2. Literature Review And Hypotheses  
The importance of cooperative banks, especially their impact on financial stability, has not received much 
attention in the empirical financial literature. In fact, the literature devoted little interest to cooperative banks in 
comparison to commercial banks especially when it comes to size and its governance system. however, Many 
studies have examined this relationship within the commercial banking sector from both theoretical and empirical 
standpoints (Goyeau and  Tarazi ,1992; Williams and Nguyen, 2005; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). 
However, the crisis of 2007-2009 has renewed the interest in cooperative banks which is displayed in the 
growing reviews treated different aspects of the subject for example its concentration competitions with commercial 
bank and its financial stability (Fiordelisi and Salvatore,2014) . Indeed, several empirical studies demonstrated the 
effectiveness of cooperative banks as commercial banks (Groeneveld, 2011) after the later’s stability has been 
questioned. For instance, Hesse and Cihak (2007) demonstrated the role played by co-operative banks in the 
economic stability, while Fonteyne (2007) traced the market share increase of cooperative banks in several 
countries. Also, Brunner and al. (2004) analyzed the revenue and profitability of cooperative banks in France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain and come up with the conclusion that cooperative banks are not less effective than the 
commercial banks. However, few studies have studied in depth the reasons behind their performance and whether or 
not its internal governance mechanism linked to the member may be the reason. A recent spate of empirical studies 
tried to find the origin of its effectiveness during the financial crisis. For example, Stefancic (2010) asserted that 
cooperative banks profitability can be explained by their prudential strategic fashion and taking a risk averse 
strategy. Yet, even fewer studies have been interested in their governance, despite the fact that the existing literature 
focused on the governance of commercial banks. For decades, the Multi-Stakeholder governance contributed 
effectively in the social economy in the European Union thus it is important to study the performance bond with its 
governance mechanism. Gorton and Schmid (1999) in their Austrian cooperative banks study pointed out that their 
efficiency is owed to the increase of their members. Nevertheless, there are several other internal factors still that 
affect theses banks performance and which haven’t been treated in the context of cooperative banks i.e employees, 
customers, customers who chose to contribute to the capital hence becomes a member (Derek C. Jones and Takao 
Kato, 2003; Estrin and Jones, 1995). 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Research Goal 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we focus on cooperative banks, which in 
turns allow us to use a homogenous data set rather than relying on dichotomous variables to control the differences 
across varied types of banks. Second, we estimate stability at the individual bank level using Z-scores. This variable 
have been used in recent studies (Boyd et al., 2006; De Nicoló and Loukoianova, 2007; Berger et al., 2009). Third, 
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we aim to empirically detect the internal factors that are causing the performance of cooperative banks before and 
after the financial crisis of 2007. For this purpose, we analyze the performance and stability of cooperative banks in 
recent years in the union European using the Z scores. Then we focus on the impact of the internal mechanism of 
cooperative banks on performance and try to detect the links internal factors with the efficiency of cooperative 
banks. To sum up, we shall investigate the hypothesis that Multi-Stakeholder governance will have a significant 
impact on the stability of the cooperative banking system. 
3.2. Sample and Data Collection 
The selected sample is a panel group of cooperative banks in 12 countries outside the European Union, namely 
France, Greece, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal, Poland, Cyprus, Netherlands, Australia, 
Finland over a period ranging from 2004 to 2011. The choice of this period is justified by the demarcation of 
cooperative banks. Indeed, the performance of cooperative banks has been remarkable in recent years and 
specifically during the financial crisis of 2007. The data used for this study comes primarily from the Bureau of van 
Dijk Bankscope database. However, we have omitted countries with unavailable data on their cooperative banks 
during such period. A set of variables were put into play to control the involvement of internal governance factors 
on the performance and stability of cooperative banks in our sample. We included variables that concern the internal 
governance of cooperative banks and the 2007–2009 ¿nancial crises that can directly affect the relationship between 
stability and governance. We also included factors that could explain bank ¿nancial soundness. In table 1, we 
describe the main variable of interest in our analysis the Z- scores, and then the other variables we included in the 
estimation. 
To investigate the relationship between bank’s stability and the Multi-Stakeholders governance first, we 
estimated stability using the Z- scores, recently used in a variety of studies Fiordelisi and Salvatore, 2014; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Mercieca et al, 2007; Goyeau and Tarazi, 1992). This measurement was calculated as the sum of 
assets on capital ratio (CAR) and the sum of the profitability of the assets of the cooperative banks (ROA) which is 
expressed as the net profit rate on total assets divided by the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA), which 
aims to educate ourselves about the degree of risk present in bank balance sheets.  
 
( )
it it
it
ROA CARZ scores
ROAV
  
                                                   (1) 
 
Various approaches have been proposed to construct Z-scores measures. In our case, we followed the 
methodology used by Dinamona and Fortin (2008) to show the performance of cooperative banks, by calculating the 
risk of bank failure during the 2007 financial crisis. The Z-scores allows us to have a measure of the reliability and 
stability of the cooperative banking system. Plus the value of z-score, the higher the bank default risk is low. We 
used both pooled ordinary least squares regressions and ¿xed-effects panel regressions to control spurious 
relationships and country-septic effects in our tests of whether changes in stability predicts variations in bank risk 
measures. We also studied the impact that multifarious factors of governance have on the stability–risk relationship, 
such as the importance of increased multi-stakeholders, the ¿nancial crisis, and the size of the bank. We used both 
pooled ordinary least squares regressions and ¿xed-effects panel regressions to control spurious relationships and 
country-speci¿c effects in our tests of whether changes in stability predicts variations in bank risk measures. We 
also analyzed the impact that multifarious factors of governance have on the stability–risk relationship, such as the 
importance of increased multi-stakeholders, the ¿nancial crisis, and the size of the bank. 
 
717 Bouker Maroua /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  195 ( 2015 )  713 – 720 
 
Table 1:Variables definition 
 
Variables symbol De¿nition and calculation method 
Z-scores 
 
 
 
Z this measure is calculated as the sum of assets on capital ratio (CAR) and the sum of the 
profitability of the assets of the cooperative banks (ROA) that  is expressed as the net profit 
rate on total assets divided by the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA), which aims to 
indicate about the degree of risk present in bank balance sheets. 
Membership Gov The membership rate was used in the empirical literature as an indicator of the degree of 
participation in worker cooperatives; it is defined as the ratio of members on all workers 
(Estrin et al., 1987) , (Estrin and Jones,1995). In our case of cooperative banks, we define the 
rate of accession as Member rates on customers. Because this variable is more consistent with 
our theoretical framework.  
the members Memb Members are important not only because they are owners, but also because they are part of the 
governance structure. According to (Gorton and Schmid,1999) the performance of 
cooperative banks depends on the degree of concentration of members. More the number of 
members is increasing capital efficiency is high 
Employees Employ (Derek C. Jones and Takao Kato, 2003) employee performance plays an important role in 
organizational performance. According to these authors, the spirit of cooperation will increase 
the amount and speed of production so we  estimate this variable by the number of employees 
Size of bank Size (Abdus Samad et al.,2006) they believe there is a significant relationship between 
performance and bank size. we estimate the age of bank by the log of assets 
Age of bank Age  According to the empirical estimate of (Brown and Caylor, 2006) the age of the bank plays a 
significant role in the performance. banking we calculated by the log of number of years  
Capital Cap Berger (1995) states that well-capitalized banks are considered less risky and can therefore 
access these funds with better terms. Therefore, a higher background level should lead to an 
overall reduction in the probability of bank insolvency. it calculate by the capital of rate  
 
 
We also included in the analysis two sets of control variables to limit the problem of spurious relationships as it 
was redeemed wise to consider the age and size of the bank and capital. We calculate these measures to control the 
effects of other factors on stability. We tried to take into consideration the bank's incentives to increase its workforce 
and if the size increase and financial position of the bank do have consequences on its governance, its internal and 
external staff.  
 
 
3.3. Analyses and Results 
We started by investigating the relationship between the variables during the 2001-2009 periods and between 
different countries. Table 2 presents a statistics summary for the variables used in the regression analysis, and the 
correlation matrix of the variables. The relationship between capital and the number of customer correlation 
indicates a rather positive is elevated to (0.66). This may suggest, to Some Degree, that cooperative banks are 
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attached to the increase in number of customers. The correlation between the members, employees and size, capital 
are simultaneously represented by a correlation to (0.91) and (0.83), which means that it is not meaningful to include 
these  variables in a regression equation simultaneously. To solve this problem we preferred to remove two variables 
that have less involvement in the performance of cooperative banks. Our choice fell on variable size and used as the 
variable members are more likely to demonstrate the performance of cooperative banks. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After omission of variables, we estimate the relationship between performance and governance of cooperative 
banks. We specify the following relationship: 
 
 
1 2 3 4i t i t i t i t i t i tZ s c o r e s G o v M e m b C a p A g eD E E E E H                                   (2) 
 
Where the Z-score represents the performance, Į and ȕ are defined as the constant and the coefficients to be 
estimated and i and j represent the sample countries and years from 2004 until 2011, ڙit indicates robust standard 
errors clustered at the individual bank level. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the estimates made on a model of ordinary least square (OLS) has fixed effect. 
Indeed, to reflect dynamic changes in their environmental and financial conditions in the analysis of the stability of 
cooperative banks, and following a different test, we concluded that it is a fixed effect model. 
 
The results reported in the table display a significantly negative relationship between the stability of the 
cooperative banks and the evolution of the number of members. This result is similar to the study of Gorton and 
Schmid(1999) which has proved that the variation in the number of members have an influence on the performance 
of cooperative banks. Furthermore, the significant relationship between stability and the level of capital could be 
justified by its Direct association with the members’ number increase. In fact, that capital is based on the share of 
members may have an impact the profitability of the cooperative bank. Therefore, the correlation deducted in Table 
2 between capital and members is verified. For this, a negative impact on the performance of the cooperative banks’ 
member was supported by Hill and Jones studies (1992) stating that democratic governance can be create discord 
among stakeholders. Indeed, the members are the owners and they are part of the governance structure, may cause 
divergence of interest problems. Members are representatives in many committees and advisory bodies, therefore, 
with the increase in the diversity of their preferences, a range of conflicts of interests and information asymmetry 
can be created. In this context, this relationship can influence on one hand, the profitability of the bank by increasing 
speculation among the owners and on the other hand level of the bank’s risk; thus contradicting the risk aversion 
attitude of cooperative banks .Despite such claim, our hypothesis studying the influence of the membership variable 
was proved to be positive and significant; thus supporting its relationship with the stability of cooperative banks 
reported in table 3 and gainsaying what has been explained previously. The findings of our study support the idea 
Variable 
 
Gov Memb Cap Employ Size Age 
Gov 1.0000   
   
Memb 0.0857 1.0000     
Cap 0.0665 -0.2474 1.0000    
Employ -0.0476 0.9172 -0.2596 1.0000   
Size 0.1855 -0.2020 0.8308 -0.1908 1.0000 
 
Age -0.0537 0.2683 0.1422 0.2734 -0.0381 1.0000 
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that becoming a member of the cooperative bank encourages people to be part of these banks. Therefore, the bank's 
profitability will increase with increase number of customers, which in turns will boost the number of transactions 
occurring. 
Table 3: Equation results 
Variable 
Z-scores 
Coefficient T-value P>ItI 
 
Gov 0.0953144 2.15** 0.034 
Memb -2.756099 -1.74* 0.086 
Cap -0.15802 2.46** 0.016 
Age 2.899621 0.82 0.415 
Constante 23.2403 1.49 0.140 
observation 1920   
R sq 0.47   
Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p< 0.1, **p< 0.05 
Based to the above and on our results, we can conclude that the performance of cooperative banks is mainly 
based on the increase in ratio of accessions. Only the principle of membership can be positive for performance in the 
sense that it affects customers’ psychology, behavior by displaying a further engagement in the cooperative banks. 
To illustrate more, they can have the whole share in the bank Therefore; these results suggest that although 
membership have a negative influence on performance, made of, they are the main sources of profit cooperative 
banks. Only, they would be ill advised to limit the growth of the members’ number, and attempts to increase the 
number of members may be more consistent with the objective of better performance. This was proven during the 
financial crisis of 2007. However, the instability of their capital, it would be better to find another more stable 
source of funding to cover any future banking crisis. Moreover, our results showed us that the age of the bank is not 
significant with their performance. This result is opposed to the study of Hirtle (2007) stating that the age has no 
influence on the bank's performance. 
4. Conclusion 
Cooperative banks are perceived as a driving force in the local development. They are socially committed to the 
company and the population. In addition, they were a great help for commercial banks during the financial crisis. 
The aim of our paper was to examine the relationship of the new governance of cooperative banks on its 
performance. To reach such endeavor, our study focused on a sample of cooperative banks belonging to the 
European Union all through of the period before and after the financial crisis between 2004 and 2011. 
 
The results of our research allow us to conclude that the governance of cooperative banks have a significant 
influence on its performance. It was noticeable that the membership variable has a strong impact on its performance. 
The principle asserting that customers can become members can have a positive impact on increasing the number of 
customers. However, it was found that members have a significant and negative impact on performance. This can be 
explained by the increasing level of information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between a large number of 
leaders. Therefore, one can conclude that the membership ratio is largely responsible for the profitability of 
cooperative banks. Nonetheless, the variation of its capital and the negative influence of the members may lead risk 
of instability in the future. Governance of cooperative banks is not a cure for the banking sector after the crisis, but 
further comparative studies are needed to develop a better understanding of its performance and its involvement 
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relative to other banks in the current market conditions. 
Like any other study, ours holds its own limitations beginning with the fact that comparing commercial banks to 
cooperative ones is unfair seeing that the laters are still recent and in constant evolution. Moreover and as it has been 
discussed earlier , focusing solely on the internal resources of cooperative banks’ performance is a limitation; seeing 
that there are other factors such as external market shares etc. 
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